29 Days In, What Are America’s Options on Iran?

Original Title: Day 29: What could possibly be the U.S. options in Iran?
Original Author: John Spencer
Translation: Peggy, BlockBeats

Editor's Note: While the debate continues on whether this will escalate into a ground war, the logic of this conflict has moved beyond the traditional framework of war.

What this article attempts to answer is not whether the U.S. will "go in," but what means the U.S. might have to alter the behavior of its adversary without occupying the capital. From missiles and the navy to energy exports, power systems, information control, and internal governance structures, the target of the strikes is transitioning from a singular military capability to an entire national operational system.

In this process, the true key is no longer regime change but rather forcing adjustments in decision-making under multiple pressures by simultaneously suppressing "combat capability" and "governance capability." This nonlinear, multidimensional pressure is becoming a new logic of war.

Therefore, the most significant aspects of this conflict worth attention are not what has already occurred but the options that have yet to be unfolded.

The following is the original text:

The U.S.-Iran war has been ongoing for 29 days. Today, true strategic and military analysis is increasingly difficult to differentiate from politicized viewpoints, speculation, and narratives. Too many people habitually jump from the current situation directly to the conclusion of a "full-scale ground invasion," as if the U.S.'s only choice is to occupy Tehran, forcefully control nuclear facilities, defeat a so-called million-man army, and then once again fall into a quagmire of decades-long nation-building or Maoist-style guerrilla warfare.

This is not analysis. It is merely shallow judgment built on outdated or even biased war cognitive models.

President Trump has stated he will pause strikes on Iran's energy infrastructure for 10 days, and this deadline has now been extended to April 6. We are currently within this window of time. However, the real question is not what has already happened but rather—what are the next options.

From Military Strikes to System Paralysis

It is certain that U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and Israel will continue to conduct systematic strikes on Iran's military system. At the start of the war, Iran possessed thousands of ballistic missiles, hundreds of launchers, a distributed drone network, multi-layered naval capabilities in the Persian Gulf, and a military-industrial complex with redundancy and survivability. This system is being weakened but has not been completely destroyed.

At the same time, Israel's targeting is not limited to military capabilities alone; more crucial is to undermine the regime's ability to maintain control post-conflict. This includes eliminating the political and military leadership, targeting internal security forces like the Basij, and disrupting checkpoints, intelligence nodes, and the internal security network.

This is not just a tactical operation but a strategic pressure on both the "means" and "will": to weaken not only its combat ability but also its governance capacity. This is a way to compel a change in behavior without needing to occupy the capital.

Any discussion must anchor on established strategic objectives. According to U.S. senior figures, the goals of "Operation Epic Fury" include: destroying Iran's missile system and its production capabilities, dismantling its naval power and its ability to threaten global shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, and preventing it from obtaining nuclear weapons.

Although "regime change" has been discussed, it is not the official goal. The real objective is "behavior change." The current regime has been offered a diplomatic path to adjust its policies, which is crucial as it sets the boundaries of strategic options. The core of this war is not seizing Tehran but paralyzing the regime, destroying its capabilities, and forcing it to accept new conditions.

Even if the regime collapses under dual military and economic pressure, the U.S. can still achieve its goals in a new strategic environment. However, it is important to emphasize that achieving the goals does not hinge on regime collapse.

From this moment on, the options are not diminishing but expanding.

One option is targeting the regime's economic "center of gravity." Kharg Island accounts for approximately 85% to 90% of Iran's oil exports, usually averaging between 1.5 to 2 million barrels per day. This oil is the regime's primary source of hard currency. Controlling it, paralyzing it, or directly destroying its export capabilities would impact not only the economy itself but also the regime's ability to fund its military, maintain power networks, and uphold internal control.

This is significant because the regime has already shown signs of vulnerability under economic pressure. The January 2026 protests were triggered by inflation, banking system instability, and the inability to provide basic public services (including a severe water crisis affecting millions in Tehran). There were even discussions of relocating the capital due to the inability to provide safe drinking water. The regime's response was a large-scale violent crackdown, resulting in over 32,000 civilian deaths in one of the most brutal suppression actions in its modern history. Therefore, economic pressure is not just a theoretical deduction but has already pushed the regime to the brink.

Another option is to target the national power grid. Iran's electricity system is centralized around major urban hubs, and a precise strike on key substations and transmission nodes could trigger a cascading blackout effect across the entire region — plunging Tehran into darkness.

Once power is lost, the regime will immediately face challenges. Command and control, monitoring systems, communication networks, and internal security coordination all rely on electricity to function. By targeting key nodes with precision strikes, a widespread systemic paralysis can be triggered without completely destroying the infrastructure. The United States has demonstrated this capability multiple times in past conflicts.

Cyber warfare would further amplify this effect. Iran has previously used internet shutdowns to control society, and this capability can also be used in reverse — disrupting the regime's command network while using external systems to reconnect the population. Information itself will become a weapon, shifting narrative control, coordination ability, and cognitive advantage away from the regime.

The Strait of Hormuz remains a crucial strategic chokepoint. Approximately 20% of global oil supply (about 20 million barrels per day) flows through this channel. Iran's longstanding strategy has been to threaten and manipulate this flow.

One option is to shift from "deterrence" to "control". Occupy or neutralize key islands. Experts have long viewed Abu Musa Island, Greater and Lesser Tunbs as critical terrain for controlling the strait. The nearby Qeshm Island houses Revolutionary Guard naval facilities, missile systems, and monitoring infrastructure. These positions give Iran anti-ship missile coverage, fast attack boat operations, and maritime coercion capabilities. Once these islands are controlled or neutralized, Iran's ability to play in the strait would fundamentally change.

Iran has also established a system in the strait resembling a "toll booth." The Revolutionary Guard has effectively set up a system requiring vessels to seek approval, follow designated shipping lanes under its influence, and in some cases pay millions in "safe passage fees." Reports indicate that the cost per oil tanker could go up to $2 million, with selective passage based on political stances, while controlled shipping lanes are set near Larak Island.

The United States and Israel have the capability to systematically dismantle this system: striking its command layer, destroying coastal radars, intelligence surveillance reconnaissance nodes, and command centers, clearing out fast boats, drones, and missile sites conducting enforcement. Once this system is disrupted, Iran would lose the ability to turn global key passages into revenue sources and coercion tools.

Another related option is to interdict Iran's oil exports at sea. Iran exports about 1.5 to 2 million barrels per day, much of it completed through sanction-evading networks. By intercepting, diverting tankers, and conducting extensive inspections and seizures on a large scale, this system could be throttled close to a standstill. Currently, this action has been taken on a limited scale; if expanded further, it would bring regime revenue close to zero. With no income, there are no missiles, no proxy networks, no suppression capabilities, and even an inability to sustain the functioning of the state.

With some options still on the table, turning inward is one of them. Iran has a population of over 85 million, a high degree of youthfulness and urbanization, and longstanding dissatisfaction. Existing opinion polls, protest patterns, and observable social unrest all indicate that over 50% of the population is against the current regime, potentially even higher. This is not a solid power base. The January 2026 protests were a clear sign of this underlying pressure.

Thus far, the populace has mostly been asked to “shelter in place.” However, this strategy may change. Through information dissemination, secure channels, and psychological warfare, the populace can gradually be disconnected from the regime's control mechanisms.

Simultaneously, support can also be provided to internal resistance forces, including airdrops of weapons, communication, and intelligence supplies. Iran has multiple fault lines internally—contradictions accumulated over the long term at the ethnic, political, and regional levels, which have sparked opposition and turmoil multiple times. When external pressure is combined with internal resistance, the regime is more likely to fragment or at least face greater pressure.

Meanwhile, the scope of targeting can continue to expand beyond traditional military targets. The regime's control system is essentially a network: encompassing the leadership, Revolutionary Guard headquarters, Basij forces, police, intelligence agencies, and suppression infrastructure. Striking at these nodes will accelerate the erosion of central authority.

History shows that pressure causes fractures: the military begins to hesitate, the intelligence apparatus experiences divisions, political elites realign, and personnel defect. Collaborating with these defectors often yields far greater results than mere strikes.

Of course, there remain numerous unknowns. We cannot fully grasp where the regime is strongest and weakest. However, some signs are worth noting. For instance, there are reports that Iran is attempting to expand its mobilization efforts, potentially even lowering the recruitment age to 12, indicating that it is under significant pressure. This is not the behavior of a confident regime.

These options do not stand alone but can be combined: dismantling missile systems and production capabilities, undermining naval forces, continually weakening the nuclear program, disrupting its ability for external projection. Meanwhile, by targeting the leadership and command systems, paralyzing their decision-making, and exerting simultaneous pressure in military, economic, information, and political dimensions.

At its core, the key is to simultaneously target the regime's “means” and “will,” rather than progressing sequentially. Create multiple dilemmas beyond its capacity to address, force it into a passive survival mode, elongate its decision cycle, and weaken its coordination and control abilities.

The Essence of War is “Choice within Uncertainty”

War is not a checklist, but a dynamic alignment of objectives, pathways, and means under uncertain conditions. Various options can be sequentially advanced, implemented in layers, or executed simultaneously.

At the same time, one must be wary of those who conduct analogical analysis with a sense of certainty. Iran is not Vietnam, Afghanistan, or Iraq, nor is it 1968, 2002, or 2003. The context of each situation is entirely different. Political objectives vary from "changing regime behavior" to "sustaining regime survival." Past wars often involved state-building, democratic export, prolonged insurgencies, and enemies with external sanctuaries—conditions that do not currently apply. The geographical environment, technological conditions, intelligence capabilities, and regional dynamics have all changed. The available options today are more diverse and targeted.

We know what has already happened, but we do not know what will happen next. More importantly, we cannot predict the next decisions of all parties involved.

This uncertainty is not a flaw in analysis but the essence of war.

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